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JPRS L/9909 13 August 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 28/81)



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB INVESTMENTS ABROAD REVIEWED

Paris AL-WATAN AL'-ARABI in Arabic No 224, 29 May-4 Jun 81 p 58

/Article: "Arab Investments Abroad; 1980 Surpluses: \$340 Billion_7

Text7 Before the October 1973 war, some of the Arab oil countries had established development funds to aid the Arab construction projects. These funds hit two targets simultaneously: They aided Arab projects lacking financing and invested the financial surpluses, even though the surpluses were not large at the time, in long-term loans. This is what is called capital investment. These funds followed, and still follow, in evaluating projects generally the system adopted by the International Bank for Construction and Development and by the International Monetary Fund, with an important difference, namely that of taking into consideration the social yield of every project instead of restricting the evaluation to a project's material yield.

These funds could have stayed the favorite venue of investment for the Arab oil countries had not fundamental changes occurred, starting with 1973 and especially after 1979 which witnessed the second major rise in oil prices.

The first change lies in the fact that the oil countries have become a world financial power in a short time and have come to possess large surpluses. It has also become evident that the size of these surpluses exceeds by far the investment capabilities of the Arab funds, even though the capital of these funds has been raised.

The second change is a result of the first change and it is that the central banks of the oil countries have become compelled to play directly, or through their organizations, a purely commercial role through the investment of these surpluses. The new role (capital investment) is not confined to the central banks but has included some of the private banks which have benefited from the increased wealth of their countries. By virtue of this new role, the Arab banks have come to occupy a position in the international arena through their effective participation in the world capital market. This position will continue to be strengthened.

Size of Surpluses

The inevitable question is: What is the volume of these surpluses, what are the details of their investment and where do they exist?

The FINANCIAL TIMES (14 October 1980) estimates the foreign assets of the major oil countries (the Arab Gulf countries and Libya) at more than \$340 billion by the end of 1980, of which 120 billion were realized in 1980 alone. Three quarters of the 1980 surpluses were realized by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the UAE.

These assets have been invested either directly through the purchase of stocks, bonds and so forth or through participation in the capital market, i.e. through advancing long-term loans to international firms and establishements.

The direct commercial investment is what drew attention in the first phase due to the clamor which accompanied some transactions, such as Kuwait's attempt to purchase 15 percent of the Getty Oil Company for one billion dollars at the beginning of the summer of 1980. This attempt did not succeed because of the opposition of the Getty family and of the U.S. administration. This clamor urged the Arab investors to be more careful and cautious. We must note that the Arab investors have chosen three main markets for their investments:

The United Kingdom for a historical reason emanating from the link between the currencies of some of the Gulf countries with the Sterling zone during the protectorate period and the immediately following period and for a current realistic reason, namely the activity of the London money market and the strength of the pound sterling.

The FRG and Japan because of the technological superiority of these two countries.

The United States because of the international role of the dollar.

In addition to these detailed reasons for every market, there is an additional common reason for all these markets (countries), namely the political stability they enjoy as a result of the weakness of their communist or radical leftist parties.

This is the general geographic framework of the direct investment. There is, however, divergence from these geographic borders at times, such as Libya's purchase of 10 percent of the stock of the Italian Fiat Company and Kuwait's purchase of 15 percent of the stock of Brazil's Volkswagen Car Company. But even in the latter example, what is intended by the investment is the German technology, represented in the Volkswagen Company, and not Brazil.

Investment Means

In these major markets, the means of direct investment have been diverse and we will review here the most important of them:

The purchase of shares and stocks in major international firms: The Saudi investments in the U.S. market have been channelled toward the real estate, hotel and mining sectors. It was announced nearly 2 months ago that 17 percent of the shares of the Kaiser Steel Company were purchased by Lebanese financier Roger Tamraz, who operates from the Bahamas, jointed with three Saudi partners for the sum of \$57.4 million. Kuwait has also purchased shares in the biggest U.S. oil companies, such as Exxon (the biggest in the world), Texaco, Getty Oil, Mobil and Standard Oil of California. Kuwait has also purchased a considerable part of the stock of the Eastern Airlines Company.

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However, what mostly restricts the purchase of U.S. stocks are the two conditions imposed on any transaction seeking the purchase of 5 percent or more of the stock of any company. These two conditions are:

Prior approval by the U.S. administration through the Stocks and Banking Commission.

Announcement of all the details of a transaction.

So as not to fall into this restriction, Kuwait has been content to purchase 4.9 percent of the stocks of the 20 biggest U.S. banks.

In addition to investing in the U.S. firms, Kuwait has also turned to investing in the stocks of Japanese firms. Perhaps the most important of these firms is Hitachi (in which Kuwait has become the fourth biggest stockholder), the Kobota sic Company (in which Kuwait has become the 10th biggest shareholder) and the (Asahi Glas) Company. These investments have been made through British, Swiss and Hong Kong banks.

No further details are available in this respect because such transactions do not like, by their nature, to advertize themselves.

Short Term Deposits: The Arab oil countries invest a part of their surpluses in short-term deposits. The purpose of this type of investment is dual: To make such funds available on short notice and to diversify, i.e. to distribute the investments in several spheres and several fields instead of putting them all in one place (don't put all your eggs in one basket). What is sought here is not the yield of these investments primarily but to reduce the risks. This is the so-called theory of "security instead of yield."

Perhaps SAMA \angle Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency $\overline{/}$ is the biggest investor in this sector, considering that its investments in the top 20 banks in the world amount to at least \$500-600 million.

Treasury Bonds: The first bonds to benefit from the Arab investments were the U.S. treasury bonds even though the benefit has been partial, meaning that it has been confined to certain bonds. In 1980, the Japanese treasury bonds discovered the Arab investments, or vice versa. This is not important. What is important is the outcome. The information available to several Arab central banks contributed to the purchase of Japanese bonds in 1980.

The Arab public and private investment establishments will have a decisive fundamental role in financing the \$6-billion loan which France and the FRG will seek in 1981 and 1982.

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AFGHANISTAN

FREEDOM FIGHTERS' ORDEAL DETAILED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072, 22 Jul 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Denis Ropa: "An Impossible Victory"]

[Text] The guerrillas in the province of Konar in northeastern Afghanistan have just captured the Nari outpost, 25 km from the Pakistan border, thus asserting control over the Pech valley and encircling the neighboring garrisons of Barikot and Asmar, which can now be resupplied only by helicopter. Trucks loaded with weapons (AK 47 assault rifles, ammunition, mountain howitzers, artillery pieces) have been taken from the "enemy."

Pretext

This exploit was accomplished by the "rebel" groups of the Nuristan Front, headed by a former prefect who joined the ranks of the resistance, Anwar Amin. The villagers of the region, who had so far been hesitant about joining up, have now done so and are negotiating with the authorities their passage to Pakistan.

For the past several months, there has been no mention of the occupation of Afghanistan or of its people's resistance against the Red Army. There have been no meetings nor protest demonstrations in the streets and university campuses, no movie stars or singers to celebrate the Afghan resistance, as had been the case for Vietnam. Prudent and divided, the West is still using the "divisions" among Afghan fighters as a pretext to refuse them assistance or to provide minimal help, while the "Viets" had been massively supported at the time by China and Soviet Russia. What is really happening?

It is true that resistance is multiple and diverse, in the image of Afghanistan's ethnic heterogeneity. It includes many "fronts" rooted in the country's interior, as well as six political movements in exile in Peshawar, Pakistan, where nearly 2 million Afghans have presently taken refuge. These political movements remain divided.

Among them, three are the product of the explosion of the "fundamentalist" opposition movement already in existence in 1975. The oldest one is Gulbuddin Hekmatiar's Islamic Party, which claims similarities with Imam Khomeyni and has always refused to join the alliance of the other two, more moderate movements, that of Professor Yunis Khalis and the Jamiyat-e Islami.

The other three political movements, which have recently joined forces in Islamabad, are of a more liberal and pro-Western bent and were formed after the Soviet invasion: Ahmad Gailani's National Islamic Front, the National Liberation Front headed by S. Mudjadeddi and Mohammad Nabi's Islamic Movement. Their common objective is to free the country, and the Afghan people would subsequently choose their own political regime.

Assistance

The general staffs of these six fundamentalist and liberal movements established in Peshawar were integrated by the Pakistan Government following the interdiction of 42 political and religious parties in January.

At any rate, they only represent an infinitesimal part (1 percent) of the population. However, they have been the principal beneficiaries of the financial, military and health assistance from foreign countries, as well as of the humanitarian aids to the refugees. By virtue of being the recipients of such aid for redistribution, they can decide which of the various resistance movements operating within Afghanistan they will support.

These movements include a large part of the country's active forces and provide most of the resistance against the armies of occupation. Some of them were already well organized before the Soviet intervention. The centrist Hazarajat Front numbers 2 to 3 million Shi'as and claims an army of 600,000 as well as 800,000 supporters. The Nuristan Front in the Northeast has acquired an independent administration and finds its support among the traditional community structures. In these two regions, which had escaped government control as early as the end of 1978, the fronts have assumed a double function: to develop the resistance and to help the civilian population (improvements in daily life and economic restructuring).

A preparatory sovereign assembly (Loy Jirgah) had met in Peshawar on 11 May 1980, bringing together more than 900 delegates from the 22 provinces of Afghanistan. Tentative unions had been outlined: the Nuristan Front signed an alliance with the Konar tribes; the Durrani tribes, in the Southeast, formed a regional federation. In the South, the Baluchis control the province of Helmand and a large part of the province of Herat. But the "great sovereign assembly" which was supposed to meet in Afghanistan proper is being continuously postponed...

Passivity

A lack of cadre with genuine authority has not permitted the unification of the resistance movements. The former Zaher Shah, exiled in Rome, could have played the role and actually advanced his candidacy a number of times. However, his passivity is against him, and the anti-monarchical movements blocked the negotiations. The same situation prevails among the fundamentalist and the liberal factions of the political movements.

"God will come to our aid!" This is the war cry of these men who are, nevertheless, united in their will to throw out the invaders. In the field, after a year

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and a half, combat losses (6,000 to 7,000 dead according to the resistance, but surely double that) are largely compensated by the number of those who are joining the combatants, now risen from 40,000 to 80,000 men.

Tactics have also been modified. Gone are the days when the mujahedin came down into the valleys, turbans floating to the wind, to face Russian tanks with hunting rifles. Attacks are now being carried out against the enemy's rear guard by much smaller groups (50 to 150 men at most) who divide the tasks among themselves. As a result, with their approach having been signaled long before by Afghan look-outs, Russian tanks are often reduced to burning with napalm villages deserted by their inhabitants, only to set an example. As for large cities—with the exception of Kabul, the capital—guerrillas can afford to occupy them for many days to reorganize their networks, as was the case recently in Qandahar and Herat, the second and third largest cities in the country.

With an army of almost 100,000 men, the Soviets seem to have abandoned their goal of total victory over the Afghan resistance. Indeed, they cannot increase their forces without sacrificing more of their soldiers or provoking a genocide that would be difficult to carry out for international reasons.

In turn, the Afghans cannot hope to win as long as they are not united and will not receive a considerably more substantial financial and military assistance from friendly countries. For the most part, their weapons consist of what they have been able to capture from the enemy: antitank cannons (RPG-25 and RPG-75), AGS-17 grenade launchers and Kalashnikov rifles. However, quantities are insufficient. They especially lack ammunition, mines and ground-to-air missiles to destroy their worst enemies in the mountains: the giant Mi-24 helicopters.

If the Afghan resistance does not receive the military support it has been unsuccessfully requesting for over a year, the USSR, which controls the cities and the main communication thoroughfares, would be able to implement a more realistic objective on an average term basis: by industrializing the country, it would form a reservoir of technicians and workers trained in socialist countries who would be devoted to it and would repudiate these mujahedin, certainly courageous but belonging to another era. Thus would come the death of the Afghan resistance, caused by the country's very people.

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IRAN

NEW PRESIDENT DENOUNCES MARXISTS

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English No 81, Jul 81 pp 36-38

[Interview with Muhammad Ali Rajai, prime minister, by Nasira Sharma, date and place not given: "Reforms in Office Not Due to Ideology"]

[Text]

Sharma: The Iranian people stood up against the old regime to bring about revolution so that class-difference would be wiped out, wealth equitably distributed among the people and the quality of life improved. When the Iraq-Iran war broke out it was expected that the socialist countries of the world would support Iran, but it was not so. Why?

Rajai: I personally do not believe that the people went for revolution just for the sake of food, clothes and shelter. In this regard we are different from the Marxists. Our revolutionary slogans were not for these. We stand for freedom and Jamhouri-e-Islami. We have faith in God, the Quran and Khomeini, and the people are convinced that if an Islamic Government is established, problems of food. clothing and shelter will be solved.

The people want Islamic rule, which by its very nature is the greatest enemy of imperialism. Before the present Iraqi aggression they brought about the Kurdish problem and staged several unsuccessful coups against us. Islam is fighting a total war against the imperiods and their wrong ideology.

□ Why are the socialist countries not supporting you when you have the same ideology?

O Unfortunately, the socialist countries are exhibiting the weakness of their own ideology and character. We are Muslims and we believe in the international issue of Islam. We rely on God and hence defend the truth even if it is against our personal interests, whereas others always look to their personal interests.

If a socialist country wants to help us, it should prove its good faith by fighting against imperialism even if it goes against its personal interests. When the US cut off diplomatic relations with us and imposed an economic embargo, the so-called socialist countries sided with it, directly or indirectly. The socialist countries do not support the truth.

In those Muslim countries where the majority of the population is non-Shia, is there support for the Islamic Revolution of Isan?

O Muslim populations are one thing and Muslim governments are another. The latter may be Muslim merely in name and appearance. Muslim people definitely support and help us irrespective of nationality. Muslims all over the world have expressed their readiness to come and achieve martyrdom in this war with Iraq and its supporters. But some Muslim governments, unfortunately, are not willing even to condemn this aggression.

□ Why do you not solve the problem of Kurdistan by giving autonomy to the region within a federal framework? Why is the war continuing, and what do the Kurds want from you?

There is no war between the Kurdish people and the Central Government. It is the Marxists who are fighting in Kurdistan. The Kurds had severe differences with the Shah and not with us. He was not only inhuman to the Kurds but also to other Iranians. But we are not inhuman.

Marxists used to say that only they could bring revolution to Iran, but their claim has proved bogus. The Revolution has been brought by Islam and they have failed.

These defeated Marxists have engineered these divisive schemes in Kurdistan in the name of Kurdish nationalism. Islam believes in one nation. We are internationalists and believe in one Muslim nation.

There are no Arab Muslims or Kurdish Muslims. They are just one entity. Muslims of Iran or Libya or Syria or of the African countries are essentially one as they follow Islam and believe the Quran. We do not believe in national or international divisions or for that matter in geographical or racial divisions.

☐ But Marxists also have the same philosophy. They don't attach much importance to national or geographical

partitioning of the world.

OAt present Kurds are fighting against Iraq and the Marxists are against us. At present, in Kurdistan, the war is just the result of anti-revolutionary and Marxist forces.

□ But the Kurds want autonomy.
○ Iran is faced with many problems all at once: anti-revolutionary forces, Marxists who are always out to fan trouble, the Kurdish situation, the Iraqi war. Why think only of Kurds? We should think about the Arabs too. Within the constitution of our Islamic Republic there are specific provisions to safeguard the interests of different people. We have hardly had time to implement these provisions. Let the war be over, and we shall find amicable solutions to all such problems.

☐ You said that the Marxists are anti-revolutionary, but they played a

big role in the revolution.

OThey had had no special role in the revolution. Every one fought against the Shah, including Marxists. We incessantly fought the Shah for 50 years and the communists did lend some support in this. Our objectives were different, although both of us wanted change. The Muslims wanted Islam but the Marxists did not.

The Tudeh Party as well as the Fedayeen guerrillas fought against the Shah, but their motives were different. They did not want Islamic Revolution. They wanted the Shah to remain and reform the Majlis. We said that the Shah must go. We wanted total revolution whereas other 'groups wanted modifications.

Imam Khomeini was convinced that for a total revolution the Shah must go, and this conviction was shared by all the Muslims. The Marxists and the nationalists participated in the struggle, but the credit

for victory of the revolution does not go to them. In the fighting they substantially gained by acquiring weapons which they did not return. We, the followers of Islam, returned all the weapons and now do what the government wants.

□ But the Islamic Republican Party and the Communist Party both want to work for the welfare of the people and not for capitalism, which even now has substantial roots in Iran. As things are, the masses are miserable and exhausted, especially on account of unemployment and inflation.

O The present unemployment has little to do with capitalism. Unemployment is a typical by-product of any revolution. Was the Russian Revolution a capitalist revolution? Did they not suffer from unemployment after their revolution? Was not the French Revolution followed by unemployment and inflation? When a country such as Iran gets rid of the capitalist system, and thousands of companies with an average strength of about 200 engineers each are closed, there is bound to be unemployment.

I have no exact figures, but I may say that we had thousands of artificial jobs which were spurious and not essentially productive. There were thousands of various types of shops all over Iran, including those selling lottery tickets. We had more than 12,000 waiters. Do you think they were gainfully employed? It was disguised unemployment and it was a dead weight on

the economy.

To achieve freedom for the people is one thing and to provide them with jobs is another. Our revolution was aimed at cleansing society and wiping out those who exploited the people — traders and merchants who were parasites. In the process we may have created unemployment. The inflation, however, is mostly due to the economic embargo imposed by the US and to this war. Tell me which country has

been able to escape inflation.

☐ Imam Khomeini delivered a speech 17 years ago in which he emphasised the freedom of the press. Why then is the pen not free today? Some 55 newspapers have been banned, and people are expelled if they are communists. Do you think this may cause irreparable damage to the nation, and that Iran may experience a civil war on account of these ideological differences?

Of all the ministries, there are three from

which we are obliged to exclude the Marxists, because of their ideological viewpoint: the Ministries of Law and Justice, Defence and Education. Unless one firmly believes in the tenets of Islam and is quite conversant with it, one cannot give justice and decide cases according to the dictates of Islam. How can we entrust such

a task to a person who is Marxist?

In the fight against Iraq we cannot employ a Marxist, for he will fight only for his own ideology. We need dedicated soldiers and mercenaries. They must have Islamic views and the conviction to fight for them. We cannot have Marxists in the defence forces. Further, those who do not believe in Islam and Jamhourhi-e-Islami cannot be given the job of teachers. We cannot entrust education to Marxists. They cannot be allowed to teach our young generation.

A young, impressionable child should learn to read and write according to the basic framework of the society in which he lives. The Government is very anxious to resettle all employees who have been expelled. I want them to be productive.

The other group being expelled are Savaki, the friends of the Shah who collaborated with him in his brutaltiy. Many of these now claim that they are Marxists. They hide the truth. Some who have been expelled allege that they have been victimised because they support (Iranian President Abol-Hassan) Bani-Sadr. The fact is that they have been expelled on account of their absenteeism or laziness. These reforms in the offices are not due to ideology.

□ The Fedayeen participated fully in

the revolution and their aim is essentially anti-imperialist. How can you promote the cause of the revolution

without their participation?

O Islam allows room for persons with a different ideology to propagate their views, but not to use force, to change the views of the older of the control of others. One cannot be allowed to impose his own views on the public. According to the Quran, a person may have a religion of his own choice. Muslims can live with others, and we have principles and laws to guide us in that matter.

Differences of ideology are permissible, but what is not permissible is to misguide others. We find that in factories labourers are encouraged to strike and stop work. On inquiry we find that the labourers have been misguided by an unconcerned person,

say a university professor of sociology or a final-year medical student. We cannot permit anti-revolutionary movements and there cannot be any freedom for ideological propaganda by a minority section of the

☐ You were a teacher who taught, fought and suffered during the Shah's regime. How do you justify the present closure of universities and the attacks on the progressive elements?

O These "progressive elements" had fired at students from inside the university campus last year, before this government was in power. Disturbances took place and the Revolutionary Council decided to close the universities. The process of reopening is bound to be tedious and long, for it would need a detailed consideration of the situation. We are at work and we believe that now it will not take much time. We are not a capitalist or an industrialised country.

The previous regime spoiled everything. We do not have money to spend carelessly. We do not have the required number of good teachers. We had a few medical colleges, but no medicine was taught seriously during the four years of the course. Most of the teachers were busy collecting fat salaries by taking up teaching assignments in other cities like Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Kirmanshah and Rasht. They spent one day at each place every week. They could earn up to 10,000 tumans a month. Such teachers have now left the country.

☐ Thank you for kindly sparing some of your valuable time to see me.

OI feel that those who informed you on certain things are not faithful to Jamhouri-e-Islami. I must tell you that we do not have ulterior motives either personal or partisan. People are with us, and all of us are involved in nation-building. The participation of the people is massively with us, and they would not tolerate antirevolutionary activities at any cost, even in TV programmes. They would not wait for the Government to step in to curb the anti-revolutionary elements and activities.

The decision-making rests with the masses. The masses have full faith and confidence in Imam Khomeini, and they cannot tolerate anything against him. There are some people disseminating wrong propaganda on unemployment and inflation. I am afraid that your ideas are

influenced by such propaganda.

☐ My goal is to get views from all sides.

But I feel that that unity which had

made the masses rise up against the Shah is no longer there. Why?

It is natural.

Why is it natural?

During the revolution, "Death to the Shah" was a slogan welcomed by all, but "Long live Islam" is not a slogan which is welcome to holders of all ideologies. When a government is established on an ideology, then the other ideologies are bound to be in a state of discomfiture.

Had our revolution been different, and like that of Algier's nationalist movement, then things would have been different. Their aim was to expel France but not to establish Islam. So for them their task was finished. We would be unhappy if we gave up our ideology. I am happy even if I am getting 7,000 tumans a month, but would not be happy if I got 20,000 tumans and did not have my ideology. not have my ideology.

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IRAN

BANI-SADR INTERVIEWED AFTER ARRIVAL IN PARIS

PM801235 London THE TIMES in English 30 Jul 81 p 9

[Telephone interview with Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, former president of Iran, in Paris by Hazhir Teimourian; date not given: "Khomeyni's Heavy Responsibility for the Tragedy of Iran"]

[Text] [Question] Mr Bani-Sadr, we were led to believe that you were determined to stay inside the country. What made you change your mind?

[Answer] I very much hope that my stay abroad will be temporary this time. One of my aims was to stop the cycle of explosions and acts of destruction on the one hand and government reprisals and executions on the other. I contacted Mr.Khomeyni many times, directly and indirectly, but my requests were not accepted by him.

I subsequently thought it useful to visit abroad after the elections, because the people of Iran demonstrated how unpopular those who have usurped power are. According to our findings only about three million people voted in the presidential elections. The regime fabricated the other 11 million.

I still believe myself to be duty-bound to the nation to struggle for the realization of our original aims at the start of the revolution. Mr Khomeyni promised me personally many times before the revolution in Paris to respect the right of the people of Iran to democratic liberties.

I was myself actively involved then in formulating our aims. But unfortunately, when we succeed in attaining government, the lust after power stopped our progress towards achieving our goals. In fact, quite the reverse has been achieved.

[Question] How much is the Ayatollah at the mercy of those who surround him? Do they mislead and misinform him, in your view, or do you hold him personally responsible for the tragedy?

[Answer] It is irrelevant whether he knows what he is doing or not. I have accepted full responsibility for all my actions, even though some of them can now be seen to not have been the best course. I think that Mr Khomeyni hears heavy responsibility for the appalling disaster that has befallen the country. To a large extent, he has imposed this course upon our people.

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[Question] There has been press speculation here that your best option might be to join the Kurds in the western region of the country where they exercise full control. It is thought that given the present reign of chaos in the Ayatollah's Iran, you could overthrow the Tehran government from the safety of that region which you could proclaim a liberated zone. What is your view on this subject?

[Answer] I have never seriously contemplated that path. In fact, I remained in Tehran throughout the period of my hiding. No, we must think of a faster solution to the problem for the whole of the country. We must try to find a quicker way of overthrowing the absolutists who lust after power only, and we must stop the Americans from installing a government in Iran. It is urgent.

[Question] How temporary do you expect this your second exile in Paris to be?

[Answer] Very temporary.

[Question] While you were in hiding, did you contact other opposition leaders who are also in hiding? For example, Mr Hedayat Matin-Daftari, leader of the National Democratic Front and a former friend of yours?

[Answer] No, there were no such contacts made.

[Question] Finally, could I ask you how you arranged for your flight abroad?

[Answer] We simply arranged it with the people in charge and went to the military airfield, where the plane was waiting for us. Of course it was dangerous, but life is full of such dangers.

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IRAN

BANI-SADR AWAITS FALL OF KHOMEYNI REGIME

LD020920 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Aug 81 p 7

[Article by Amir Taheri]

[Text] The escape from Tehran of Iran's deposed president, Abol-hasan Bani-Sadr, aboard an air force plane last week has precipitated a new purge of the country's armed services. At least three air force officers are said to have been executed near Hamadan and about 200 others in a number of areas have been arrested and charged with having colluded in the escape.

Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, told the assembly that the air force was "filthy through and through and should be cleansed." Now there are fears that the purge will spread to the ground forces. Military commanders recently fended off a "cleansing" operation by the ruling Muslim fundamentalists, but will not be able to do so again in the wake of Bani-Sadr's escape.

The aircraft that brought the ex-president to Paris, where he was granted political asylum, was piloted by Colonel Behzad Moezi, one of the 57 air force pilots released from jail by Bani-Sadr at the start of the Iran-Iraq war last September. Almost all of these have now been arrested again.

Moezi was supposed to fly the Boeing 707 on a routine mission to south west Iran. Bani-Sadr, dressed as a soldier and minus his moustache, was smuggled aboard with his companions after being brought to the air base outside Tehran in a van, hiding behind crates of eggs. Moezi--who also piloted the shah on his last journey from Iran and was later jailed by Khomeyni for his royalist sympathies--told the crew 15 minutes after take-off that he was hijacking the aircraft and that they should obey him.

Reliable reports indicate that the Iranian air force is virtually grounded by the new wave of arrests, which has hit the technical staff as well as aircrew. A committee of three mullahs has been appointed to approve all military flights. Some Muslim hardliners have even called for the arrest and trial of the defence minister and air force commander, Colonel Javad Fakuri.

The deposed president says he counts on the armed forces to "do their duty" in ending Ayatollah Khomeyni's rule, which he described as "the most tyrannical in

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our history." But for the moment he considers his main asset to be the urban guerrilla organizations which have launched a wave of assassinations and bombing attacks in Iran.

The ex-president has brought with him Massoud Rajavi, the 33-year old guerrilla leader whose organisation, the Mujaheddin, has been blamed for the assassination of some 200 leading supporters of Khomeyni in the past two months. Rajavi is the Islamic authorities' most wanted terrorist. Some 50 of his comrades have been executed in recent weeks.

Bani-Sadr first went to a four-bedroom flat in Cachan, a suburb of southern Paris. It was here that he lived during his last period of exile, under the shah--and it is here that he received Khomeyni in the autumn of 1978 after the religious leader had been expelled from Baghdad. Yesterday he moved to a villa outside Paris for "security reasons."

A stream of Iranian and foreign friends visit Bani-Sadr. He tells them he does not believe his stay in exile will be long. But he seems frustrated by an undertaking he gave to the French in return for being granted asylum. He promised not to engage in political activities while on French soil.

Bani-Sadr says the Khomeyni regime lost its legitimacy because of what he calls the "national boycott" of last month's presidential election of his successor, Muhammad 'Ali Raja'i. He claims that Khomeyni has lost effective control of the country; the regime must now be dislodged by "popular forces."

The ex-president is clear about what he expects to follow. He believes he can organise a wave of nationwide strikes and protest marches in Iran within the next few weeks. He predicts "the full collapse of the economy" by the end of the summer. The "usurpers," as he calls Khomeyni's government, would be forced to step up repression of dissidents on a larger scale than ever before, further alienating the people.

Meanwhile, the Mojahedin, now allied to six other urban guerrilla groups, would "eliminate Khomeyni's officials throughout the country." Top of the hit-list would be key members of the Majlis. Iran would reach the point of full-blown crisis—and the armed forces would intervene "to respond to the will of the people and invite the legitimate president to return home."

Bani-Sadr has appointed Rajavi to supervise the plan to overthrow Khomeyni. He has been declared head of an as-yet vague "Revolutionary Resistance Council." The ex-president's right-hand man, Ahmad Sanamatian, who escaped with him, is in charge of the political side of the operation.

The exiled Iranian leader has asked his supporters to woo democratic governments and organisations, persuading them that the present government in Tehran is falling apart and that Iran's future lies with Bani-Sadr.

The plan is for the Revolutionary Resistance Council to develop into a provisional government, ready to take over and supervise the transition after Khomeyni's fall.

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Bani-Sadr hopes that other opposition groups inside and outside Iran will join the council soon. His friends claim that they are in touch with the former Iranian premier, Mehdi Bazargan, who is still in Tehran.

He also says he counts on support from the left-wing Iranian National Front and from a number of religious leaders who oppose Khomeyni. He claims to have the backing of "at least 80 percent of the people."

Bani-Sadr refuses to make any personal attacks on Khomeyni, his former friend and ally. He is bitter about remarks attributed to him about the Ayatollah. He says he will give his assessment of Khomeyni "at the right moment."

Bani-Sadr has rejected suggestions that if Khomeyni is ousted, he should be put on trial. He says he would send the Ayatollah back to the religious city of Qom and ban him from further "interference" in politics.

The ex-president complains of Western ignorance of developments in Iran. He claims that the present government in Tehran is paving the way for a second Afghanistan, an invasion or takeover by the Russians. If he were given adequate support, he says, he could avert this.

However, according to his friends, so far he has has no direct political contact with any of the Western powers. He is said to be considering invitations from the Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, and from a former premier of Sweden, Olof Palme.

It seems clear that Bani-Sadr will wait for a short while before trying to persuade the French to lift their ban on his political activities. He believes that once the present wave of anti-French feeling in Iran has died down, France may relent. If not, he may go to Sweden or Austria to continue his struggle against the Ayatollah.

The ex-president indirectly accepts responsibility for the current clashes in Iran. He says he offered Khomeyni a deal to end the cycle of violence and counterviolence. If Khomeyni stopped further executions, Bani-Sadr would order the guerrillas to halt their attacks on government officials and revolutionary guards. The Ayatollah has not replied.

Bani-Sadr hopes that other exiled opposition forces will accept his leadership quickly, making it possible to launch a united assault against the Ayatollah's republic. But the other leaders have been cool towards the idea. The shah's last premier, Shahpour Bakhtiar, also in Paris, has rejected Bani-Sadr's overtures, and described him as "an accomplice to Khomeyni's crimes."

Only 'Ali Amini, a former Iranian premier, has welcomed Bani-Sadr. He said that fighting Khomeyni could not be anyone's monopoly; former aides of the Ayatollah should be given a chance to correct their past mistakes.

Reports from Tehran indicate that Bani-Sadr's escape has been welcomed privately by the government. His presence inside the country was seen as an illustration

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of the government's inability to secure effective control of the country. The regime has asked formally for Bani-Sadr's extradition from France on some 30 charges, many of which carry the death penalty.

Rajavi is also wanted on murder charges. A West German Interior Ministry report claiming that Rajavi's organisation had links with the Baader-Meinhof group, the IRA and the Italian Red Brigades has been produced by Tehran in support of its demand for extradition.

It is, perhaps, too early to write off Bani-Sadr as a spent force. The ex-president plans to launch a daily newspaper in Europe soon and smuggle "tens of thousands of copies into Iran." He has also started recording cassettes in which he calls for the revolution to continue and appeals to the armed forces "to rise and side with the people."

The Mojahedin provided him with the organisation he needs. They have a network of highly-trained cadres inside Iran and many sympathisers among Iranian students abroad. They seem to have been promised that Rajavi would be appointed prime minister if Bani-Sadr returns to power.

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IRAQ

POSITIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF RAID ON NUCLEAR REACTOR EXAMINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jun 81 p 106

[Article by Nabil Maghribi: "Positive Ramifications"]

[Text] Have not the reactions to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations abounded with positive lessons that can be employed to serve the Arab causes?

The truth is that the positive ramifications, if we may use the phrase, of this attack are numerous, the most important being the fact that it has generated an immediate Arab consensus for which we have been yearning amidst the conflicts and disputes existing in the area. What the struggling and honorable masses hope for is that this consensus will last and gain strength and will not be a mere transient reaction in the face of the dangers threatening all of us.

The raid has confirmed with flagrant proof this time—and this is an important positive lesson—that Israel is playing the Iranian card and that the Iranian regime is playing the Israeli card in the chain of attempts to weaken this nation and to undermine its capabilities and morale. The two sides (Israeli and Iranian) agree—whether those who disagree with us like it or not—on one goal. This is what the Iraqi leadership exposed as of the first moment of the eruption of the war with Iran. Perhaps the raid has come to prove to those "with good intentions" that Iraq's warnings in this regard were justified and perhaps they will reconsider previous positions about which the least that can be said is that they have been positions far from the required sense of national responsibility.

One of the positive ramifications of this aggression is that it has produced, perhaps for the first time in this manner, an international consensus to condemn Israel. The world information media and the various organizations and peoples have agreed on denouncing the Israeli piracy. The Iraqi diplomacy, and along with it the Arab diplomacy, has moved effectively and decisively at the various fronts to employ the international condemnation in explaining Israel's schemes and its disregard for the international principles and laws. We have proven that it is possible to explain our cause to the world public opinion successfully when the efforts are consolidated and the viewpoints united and when goodwill prevails.

Another positive ramification is that the Israeli enemy has proven once more that Israel views Iraq as the main danger threatening its "ambitions" in the area. After the Egyptian regime's departure from the battle, the Iraqi soldier has become

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the fundamental mainstay in any future military confrontation. Moreover, this soldier's triumph in the war with Iran and the great field experience with which he has emerged, as well as his rising morale, constitute altogether a danger which Israel views with concern.

Yet another positive ramification of the raid is that it has confirmed that our next battle will be a battle of advanced technology and that Israel views any Arab technological progress as an unacceptable danger.

President Saddam Husayn revealed from the outset the importance of the Arab technology and of its development in winning the future battle. He has called on numerous occasions for exploiting the various capabilities available in the industrialization and modernization battle and in developing the means of dealing with the "machine." For this purpose, Iraq concluded in 1975 the agreement for setting up a nuclear center for scientific research. Since then, Iraq has been working in the scientific and nuclear field silently and in freedom from fabricated clamor and from the "platform" speeches to which we have been accustomed. This is something that Israel could not imagine would happen.

Perhaps this very raid will motivate several Arab countries to carry on with their scientific efforts and to invest their monies and their capabilities in training the Arab man to deal with the technology of the future without "complexes" and without obstacles.

On these bases, it can be said that Israel has lost heavily. Begin has not been able to realize the goals for which he had planned through this kind of action. Rather, he has intensified the determination of Iraq, both the leadership and the people and all the masses behind them, to answer the challenge with a double challenge by continuing the nuclear plan on the one hand and by intensifying the efforts to develop the Arab technology and the capabilities of the Arab man on the other hand in anticipation of the hour of the major confrontation.

No...

Who has said that the Arabs have lost in this raid?

We have lost some equipment but the will is stronger today than what it was yesterday.

The men who planned for the nuclear reactor can build other reactors today and tomorrow.

Tomorrow is not far for him who looks for it.

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IRAO

IAEA OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jun 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Nabil Maghribi: "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Interviews International Atomic Energy Agency; Official Spokesman: Tammuz Was Scientific Center That Didn't Require Strong Protection"]

[Text] Last week colleague Nabil Maghribi went to Vienna, where the headquarters of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is located to record on the spot the reactions to the Israeli attack and to record an important interview with the agency's official spokesman.

The weather is sunny in Vienna and the glass of the three skyscrapers occupied by the IAEA offices shines under the light of the brilliant sun. Inside these skyscrapers, there is ceaseless activity. There are 1,600 employees working in three main sectors forming the major sections of the agency: The Energy Section, the Isotopes Section and the Guarantees Section.

The guarantees sector is the one entrusted with watching the nuclear reactors and research centers of the 110 member countries of the agency. It is the sector directly concerned with implementation of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, symbolized by the three Latin characters T.N.P. (it was ratified in 1968 and came into force in 1970).

The IAEA is run by three organizations: The General Assembly, the Board of Governors which comprises 34 countries, including four Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan), and the General Administration which is headed by Swedish Physicist Seigfrid Eklund who has been holding this position for 20 years. This week, he asked to be relieved of his responsibility. The General Assembly, which will convene in September, will appoint his successor.

The agency's annual budget amounts to \$100 million paid by the member countries in accordance with the financial contribution shares approved in the UN.

Pervasive Wrath

As soon as you enter the agency's headquarters, which are subject to strict security guard, you feel as of the first instant that the Israeli attack against the Iraqi reactor Tammuz-1 or Osirak has preoccupied the interest of all the agency

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workers. One of the main guards, an Austrian, hastened to tell me, while checking my press card and examining the appointment book: You are definitely here to record the reactions to the Israeli attack, isn't it so?

On the fourth floor, the reception was warm. The Information Department officials welcomed the Arab press and expressed their full readiness to offer any help capable of bolstering the agency's viewpoint which has been summed up by the general director in three press statements: The first on 9 June and the other two on 12 June. These statements refute the Israeli claims. The first statement says in part that Iraq fully adheres to the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty and that the outcome of the inspections carried out by the agency on the Tammuz reactor has been positive. The second statement says in part that Iraq has fulfilled its duties toward the agency and toward the nonproliferation treaty, that the Israeli military action reveals total disregard for the agency's system of guarantees and for the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty and that this action causes great harm to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The third statement was devoted in its entirety to answer Begin's claims on the presence of a secret cellar under the main reactor.

Reiterates Some Arabic Words

I asked Hans (Friedrich Mayer), a German who is the assistant director of the Information Department, about General Director Eklund and he said: In principle, his work in the organization has ended. He has asked to be relieved and is now spending a vacation outside Austria after 2 weeks of exhausting work.

But he added in reassurance: However, the general director of information (the agency's official spokesman) is waiting for you to answer your various questions. He is the one concerned with whatever pertains to information and to the press.

On the 19th floor, Dr George (Delcoin), the agency's official spokesman, a Belgian, was extremely affable and warm. He knows Beirut well because he lived there and he can speak some Arabic. He hastened to tell me: "I hope you will be accurate in translating my statements. I am basically a legist and every word has a precise meaning. Moreover, the agency is specialized in technological matters. Therefore, it is better for the interview to be transmitted scientifically and accurately."

[Question] Begin has cast doubts on the serious nature of the control exercised by the agency for nuclear reactions. Can we know simply how this control is exercised?

[Answer] The control is extremely serious and effective, contrary to the Israeli Government's statements. One-quarter of the agency's entire budget is allocated for guarantees and control in order to prevent the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. If anything, this indicates the significance which the agency attaches to this important aspect of its concerns.

Before conclusion of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, the control was not effective. There was no neutral international organization to supervise the

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ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to try to stop the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. This treaty came to fill a significant gap in this regard.

Thus, in the 1950's and 1960's, the control was bilateral, meaning that it was exercised by the seller and the buyer only. The former required the latter to abide by certain principles and bases. Naturally, bilateral control was not adequate because it was influenced by "political objectives." Thus, the agency was entrusted afterwards with the task of control and supervision over the "guarantees" which make it certain that nuclear energy is used in the peaceful sphere.

[Question] How is the control exercised in practice?

[Answer] The agency presently has nearly 180 specialized inspectors from 50 countries and their task is confined to supervising the progress of work in the nuclear reactors and research centers. The responsibilities of these inspectors are distributed geographically, meaning that there are inspectors for Africa, Asia, certain Arab countries and so forth.

These inspectors visit the countries concerned periodically to check the reactors on the spot and to present detailed reports in this regard. They conduct a careful check on the quantities of uranium and when they find that there is a shortage in the declared amount, they ask the country concerned for a clarification in order to know the fate of the disappearing nuclear material. They then notify the IAEA of the results.

[Question] Is this all? Is the matter confined to the inspectors' check?

[Answer] No. The signatory country is committed to notifying us constantly of any modification in the course of the work. Moreover, the country which supplies another party with a radioactive substance or with a reactor is committed in turn to supplying us with all details and information. On the basis of all this, concerted studies are conducted to enable us to exercise effective control.

[Question] The Israeli authorities say that the check or control by the inspectors is ineffective because the agency is committed to notifying the country concerned of the date of the inspectors' visit 2 or 3 months ahead of time, thus enabling the country concerned to take certain measures to mislead the inspectors?

This Is Not True

[Answer] This is not true. The date of the visit is not set 2 or 3 months ahead of time. Arranging the inspections doesn't require all this time. The time may not exceed 2 weeks.

[Question] The Israeli Government also says that the control is not "serious" because the inspection is carried out over largely interspersed periods, thus allowing the state concerned to use the energy for military purposes between one inspection and the other?

[Answer] This also is not true. The inspection may be carried out monthly. It is carried out periodically and constantly. All this is done according to the information acquired and to the new developments that necessitate such a measure.

[Question] When was the last time the agency inspectors visited Iraq?

[Answer] Our inspectors visited that country last January at the peak of the war. The agency noticed that Iraq fully abides by its duties. Since then, there has been no development or modification to necessitate another inspection of the Tammuz reactor.

[Question] When will you visit Iraq?

[Answer] At the earliest opportunity. We notified Baghdad this week that the agency wishes to visit the reactor to examine the consequences emanating from the attack.

[Question] Begin has said that the agency inspectors failed to discover a secret cellar.

[Answer] At the outset, Begin said that this cellar was present at a depth of 40 meters. He then backed down and said that it was at a depth of 4 meters. This is unreasonable.

I repeat: It is unreasonable that specialists would not have discovered such a cellar if it existed. As for the 4-meter gap about which Begin has spoken, it is no secret. It is a complementary part of the center with a specific technological purpose. This gap is known to us and Iraq has made it known.

[Question] In the light of your reports and the outcome of your checks, can any criticism be addressed to Iraq regarding any particular point?

[Answer] Absolutely [not]. The agency has no observations whatsoever. Baghdad has completely fulfilled its commitments toward the IAEA and toward the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. The center is devoted to peaceful purposes. It can be therefore said that Tammuz did not, to start with, require strict military protection from Iraq. It is a research center and there are dozens like it in the U.S. universities and in other countries. Is it logical to ask for imposing military guard on a research center? What will we achieve if we adopt this principle?

[Question] Can I see your inspectors' reports?

[Answer] No. The reports are confidential and we have no right to make them public without the approval of the country concerned.

As for our annual report, it will be issued in 3 months and it usually reveals any violation of commitments. The 1980 report contains no violation by any country.

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[Question] The agency will hold its general congress (the General Assembly) from 21-25 September 1981 to study the consequences resulting from the attack. Should we expect strict sanctions against Israel?

[Answer] Naturally, sanctions are expected. These sanctions are stipulated by the agency's law or constitution. Israel may be exposed to the denial of all its rights as a member of the agency.

What About Dimona

[Question] A final question. Israel is a member of the agency but is hasn't signed the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. Does the agency inspect the Israeli reactors?

[Answer] Israel allows us to inspect one of its research reactors. But it doesn't permit anybody to inspect the progress of work in the Dimona reactor. It is well known that France is the country which supplied Israel with the Dimona reactor and France does not supply the agency with any information whatsoever on the Dimona reactor.

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JORDAN

KING HUSAYN'S TRIP TO MOSCOW DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 225, 5-11 Jun 81 p 37

/Article: "Husayn in Moscow: Soviet Salt in American Dish_7

Text7 Amman--The attempt to portray King Husayn's visit to Moscow as if it were a Jordanian turn toward the Soviet Union is exactly like the attempt to portray this visit as if it were a new Soviet influence in the Middle East. Both lack accuracy and a correct understanding of the Jordanian policy which is ultimately based on a number of Jordanian convictions. Only Jordanizing the visit permits understanding its dimensions. How do these dimensions seem?

If the Jordanian monarch's visit is measured by the contents of the joint communique issued on this visit, its results would seem small, even very limited. But if measured by Jordan's official viewpoint of the nature of the possible settlement in the Middle East, then the talks which King Husayn has held in Moscow are tantamount to a declaration of the start of a new phase in the search for peace—a phase that transcends the Camp David accords to more realistic, and perhaps more comprehensive, steps.

It is impossible to understand the Jordanian position without referring to a number of indicators which, if combined, form what may be called the "limits of the Jordanian dealing" with the solution plans projected so far by the American side and by the Soviet side. Ultimately, the Jordanian position reflects a national pan-Arab understanding of the reality of the conflict, an understanding characterized by a calm historical dimension more than being characterized by emotionalism under the impact of the political or strategic changes in the relations between the East and the West.

If King Husayn's trip to Moscow presents outwardly an additional proof that the Jordanian position is not tied to the American or the Egyptian position, then it is considered, on the other hand, a natural extension of the well-known Jordanian positions throughout the past 10 years. These positions can be checked since the day Jordan took part in the Geneva Conference which was the first U.S.-Soviet formula for a solution under the auspices of the UN.

If the Jordanian position is itself the real obstacle in the face of the Camp David negotiations, then this position in particular may result in the future in reducing the U.S.-Israeli influence on the settlement so as to make the solutions more balanced and to make these solutions take into consideration the Arab aspirations and Arab historical rights to the land, as well as to peace and progress.

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Before and After

Since the June \(\sum \) T967 war, Jordan has abided by resolution 242 which calls for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. After the October \(\sum \) T9737 war, Jordan reaffirmed this abidance. On the basis of this abidance, a Jordanian delegation led by 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Rifa'i proceeded to take part in the first disengagement \(\sum \) of forces7 talks in Geneva. In the wake of the Camp David accords and in light of the U.S. clarifications in reply to questions raised by Amman, Jordan declared its opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. settlement formula because it considered this formula unfair and incomplete. The visit made by Husayn to Moscow is a new Jordanian endeavor to make the Kremlin, after the White House, understand that the possible solutions to the conflict are neither Soviet nor American but Arab primarily, meaning that the solutions should understand the Arab viewpoint and should not come from beyond the pan-Arab will of the Arab peoples.

Further, it should be noted that the Jordanian regime has sought since 1967 to restore the West Bank with all the diplomatic means available to it. Jordan started on 15 March 1972 by projecting the United Kingdom plan on the basis of Jordanian-Palestinian concord within a federal state. But the PLO's rejection of the plan compelled Jordan to fold this plan and to resume the dialogue with the frontline states, and particularly with the PLO, in search of other solution formulas through a unified Arab position.

Jordan suffered from some /hostile/ Arab campaigns in the years 1970-73 and then came the October 1973 war and Jordan provided the proof of its commitment to Arab solidarity. On 10 September 1973, King Husayn proceeded to Cairo to meet with Presidents Anwar al-Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad and then declared full military mobilization to prevent Israel from penetrating the eastern front through the Jordanian side. Then came the Algiers summit (26-28 September 1973) and the second Islamic summit in Lahore (22-24 February 1974) to inaugurate a new era in the Jordanian-Palestinian relations. In those two summits, Jordan declared its open approval of the establishment of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in a collective step of support for the PLO in the international lobbies.

Diplomatic Confrontation

Husayn then acted at both the domestic and external levels on the suggestion of the resolutions of the Rabat summit (26-29 October 1974), even though he did not take part in that summit. Then came Camp David.

When Jordan realized that al-Sadat's step was actually independent and that all that was intended by Camp David was to neutralize Egypt and to throw the entire burden on the shoulders of the eastern front, it declared its open refusal to join the Camp David negotiations and moved toward diplomatic semi-confrontation. King Husayn made a European tour (December 1978) which ended in the UN (October 1979) to explain his view of the fair solutions. Last January, he again reaffirmed his previous positions in al-Ta'if summit.

In the light of these considerations, what new thing does King Husayn's visit to Moscow bear?

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This visit cannot be separated from two constant points in the Jordanian position—two points founded on both acceptance and rejection: Acceptance of resolution 242 which opens the door of dialogue toward a peaceful solution under the auspices of the UN, as in the case of the first Geneva Conference, and rejection of the Camp David accords which are confined to partial U.S.-Israeli solutions to the conflict; acceptance of the PLO as a fundamental party in the dialogue and rejection of the self-rule negotiations which isolate the Palestinian base from its real leaders. From this angle, the visit seems to be a Jordanian acknowledgement that the Soviet presence in the Middle East is an effective and undeniable presence and that Arab consensus can employ this presence to balance the U.S. domination of the solution plans which, it is evident so far, have not led to a fair settlement. The U.S.-Soviet dialogue may be what is needed here and King Husayn's visit is an indirect call for this dialogue.

In any case, it is no secret that three controversies dominate the current Mideast conflict: The first is an Israeli-Palestinian controversy, the second an Israeli-Arab one and the third a U.S.-Soviet controversy. Any new link in any solution at the regional level seems to be tied to agreement between Moscow and Washington as part of a deal restricted to the Middle East or expanded to include the new troubled areas in Africa and Latin America.

With Ronald Reagan's arrival in the White House, there is increased talk of what Washington calls the "Jordanian solution." If this name, which Jordan doesn't at all approve, has any political significance, then it is that no progress in the negotiations will become likely unless Jordan takes part in them. As long as the West Bank is swinging between actual occupation and the imaginary "independence" plans, Jordan's agreement with the PLO on a unified position is coupled with semi-unanimous Arab consensus and with a clear plan of action that is capable of reducing the inter-Arab conflicts and of compelling both Moscow and Washington, which have so far shared the gains due to the abundance of Arab conflicts, to acknowledge the Arab fait accompli. Yasir 'Arafat's expected visit to Moscow may enhance the Jordanian-Palestinian coordination in the coming months.

Moreover, there is nothing in what King Husayn announced in Moscow to indicate that the king is wagering more heavily on the Soviet position than he has been wagering on this position so far or that he is wagering on the U.S. position more heavily than this position can withstand in this phase. This is the proof that no Jordanian-Egyptian agreement is likely and that the Jordanian direction is ultimately the direction that agrees with the collective Arab position.

Jordanization of the solutions under the current conditions means, to a large degree, the Arabization of these solutions. Jordanization is the alternative to Egyptianization, Judaization, Americanization and Sovietization. Moreover, such Jordanization will actually help Lebanon overcome its bloody predicament.

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QATAR

AMIR'S SPEECH TO FIFTH CLASS OF QATAR UNIVERSITY GRADUATES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jun 81 pp 39-40

[Article: "Qatar University Graduates Fifth Class; Shaykh Khalifah: Developing Qatari Man Is Our Number One Weapon in Progress"]

[Text] There is an organic relationship between university and development. Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, the Amir of the State of Qatar, underlined this relationship at the ceremony held on 6 June 1981 to graduate the fifth class of graduates of the Qatari universities. The occasion, attended by the prominent Qatari officials, underlined Qatar's determination to forge ahead with both the applied and the humanitarian aspects of university education in order to create the future from an advanced position.

Addressing the university professors and students on the occasion in his capacity as the supreme president of the university, the Amir of Qatar said:

"It pleases me to welcome all of you most warmly on this blessed occasion in which we gather this time every year to celebrate the graduation of a new batch of the students of our young university. This year's occasion is the fifth of its kind. Similar occasions evoke in the soul meanings whose memory is renewed with the renewal of these occasions. Today's occasion, like the preceding occasions, is filled with such meanings and abounds with such feelings. As for the meanings, their essence is to venerate learning which has the most noble place in our religion and the highest position in our world. As for the feelings, their essence is joy and confidence: Joy in this select group of our youth for whom we have exerted our utmost efforts in order to provide them with the sharpest weapon and the noblest provisions that guarantee them the best means to secure the best life and best future, and confidence that these youths will dedicate the scientific knowledge they have gained and the technical abilities they have acquired to perform their sacred duties toward their homeland and to participate with all their capabilities in realizing the comprehensive renaissance for which it aspires."

Developing Man

The amir added: "We believe that the state derives the soundness of its structure from the sound upbringing of its citizens and that the best instrument for the progress and prosperity of nations is the minds of their sons and daughters. This is why developing the Qatari man has been in the past and will continue to be in the future our main preoccupation and one of the basic mainstays of our national policy.

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"Motivated by this belief, we have devoted our attention to establishing Qatar University and have directed the efforts with which this university is opening its path toward the realization of its noble message: The message of molding the most beneficial resources we possess, meaning by this our youth, the instrument of our present and the treasure of our future.

"While following with utter care the successful efforts exerted by our university to perform this message, it pleases us to see this university marching ahead toward completing all the requirements of its university structure and to see that it has taken in the few years since its foundation ceaseless steps in this direction. These steps have included the establishment of various specializations in sciences and humanities, not to mention four research centers for education, sciences, humanities and the noble biography of the Prophet. This year, the university opened the doors of its school of engineering to receive the first group of our children to study this branch of science. Our country is in dire need of specialists in this branch. The university has also begun implementing a complete plan for important studies, namely studies on development in the Arab Gulf states.

"We devote special attention to cooperation in national development affairs between the university and the authorities concerned with these affairs in our country. It is a source of joy that the university has actually begun its cooperation with the ministries and organizations concerned on their planned projects and their scientific activities which are channelled to serve national development in the various fields and in a manner which strengthens the university's relations with the social organizations concerned with this development and solidifies its ties with them in a way that helps realize in the best manner our national goals in this extremely important sphere. We also devote the same attention to the cooperation which the university is eager to establish between itself and the Arab Gulf universities in particular and between itself and the other universities and international organizations generally. There is no doubt that this cooperation serves the joint scientific interest of the universities and yields abundant benefits to all."

The Amir of Qatar added: "We have established our universities and have exerted our efforts to help them and to help our graduates so that each of them may carry the trust commissioned to him in the best manner. Briefly, this trust is to offer the maximum possible under the canopy of our noble Islamic principles and our deep-rooted Arab traditions so that we may realize for our people and our nation all the advancement, strength, power and impregnability that we wish for them, may contribute to spreading the spirit of cooperation, love and amity and may create security, reassurance and peace among all people. I beseech God to lead our steps on the path of right and to guide us to what is good for us and for the world. He hears imploration and answers supplication."

Cultural Challenges

During the celebration, the Qatar University professors and students expressed their joy, their appreciation and their pride in this lofty educational edifice in their country which contributes effectively to developing and enhancing the Qatari citizen's life toward the better. The generous personal care which Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad, the ruler of the state, devotes to the university and his

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constant followup on all aspects of its activities get the main credit for the development and progress which this young university has realized in record time.

The foundation of the university dates back to similar days in 1977 when the Doha Palace issued law No 2 of 1977 founding the university. The male and female teachers colleges constituted the nucleus which produced this lofty tree. It is worth noting that teaching at the two colleges started in 1973-74. Now, we find that Qatar University is a member of the Arab Universities Federation and of the International Federation of Universities. The educational degrees granted by this university are acknowledged in accordance with a resolution by the Federation of Arab Universities. Moreover, the State of Qatar has participated in the statelevel international conference on recognition of the higher education degrees and certificates given in the Arab countries and signed an agreement acknowledging the Arab educational degrees and certificates at the UNESCO in 1978. It has become customary for Qatar University to host prominent visiting professors from Arab and international universities to take part in teaching the curricula, to lecture and to hold public symposiums. Moreover, the university teaching faculty (including professors, assistant professors and instructors) comes from among the elite professors of the Arab and international universities. This is in addition to a number of Qatari teaching faculty members and of experts of the UNESCO.

In addition to the theoretical and practical colleges in Qatar University, there are a number of specialized research centers attached to it, such as the educational research center, the scientific and applied research center, the center for the Prophet's biography and Sunna, the human documents and studies center and the plan for development studies on the Arab Gulf countries. This is in addition to a number of specialized magazines and periodicals published by the university's colleges and by the various research centers.

Enrollment in Qatar University is not confined to Qatari students only but also includes students from the Arab countries and from various other countries who acquire their education in colleges with numerous specializations, namely: The colleges of education, humanities, social sciences, sciences, Shari a and Islamic studies and engineering. Preparations are currently underway to establish the colleges of information, administration and economy. A tour of the auditoriums and lobbies of these colleges is enough to give an idea of the high technological and scientific standard which rivals that of many of the world's universities. Moreover, the visitor will see the faces of male and female students from the Gulf states, Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Somalia, Ghana, India, the Senegal, Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Japan, Australia, Korea, Indonesia, the United States, Chad and Mauritania. They have all come to learn in the lobbies of this young university, Qatar University.

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